Internet Censorship in Australia

Unless you have been living under a rock you may have heard of this: Mandatory Internet Filtering. In an effort to (ostensibly at least) "protect the children", there is a plan to install filters in all Australian ISPs. Under the plan there will be two levels of filtering. One level will be optional, and will be 'child friendly'. The other , according to Minister for Broadband et al, Senator Stephen Conroy, will be mandatory, and will block all "illegal content". Sites that contain the banned content will go on a 'blacklist' that cannot be publicised and is exempt from Freedom of Information requests. An ISP employee chose to speak out against this and had the Senator attempt to silence him for his trouble.

What exactly the "illegal content" is remains to be seen, but speculation ranges from the obvious candidate of child pornography, to a broad range of Refused Classification and X18+ material and possibly some R or MA content. This largely seems to depend on what independent Senator you are attempting to buy off. 

Cynicism aside, this is an issue that should be of interest to Australians who do not want the government to decide what they can and can't view on the web. Of serious concern is how tempting it would be for a government to use this tool to it's own purposes. I'm not sure that it's quite a 'Ring of Gyges', but it is potentially pretty close. 

Given that it is too late in the evening for me to go on further I'll leave you to read up on this in your own time. Overclockers Australia is keeping a wiki on media related to this issue (note the massive explosion of interest when Senator Conroy let slip in Senate Estimates in mid October that it wasn't optional). 

Warning, shameless self-promotion approaching: I've also managed to bang out a few odds and end of my own analysis as well at Philosophy Hurts Your Head. Sites such as NoCleanFeed are also worth a look. 

Question - Is Dwarf-tossing Ethical?

Is dwarf-tossing ethical?

The question was raised in a forum at the St James Ethics Centre, but is one that, I believe, this forum should consider (if we have not done so already).

(I recall that juggling Brazilian midgets, in some ways similar to dwarf-tossing, was a pass time of the late Professor C Ooly McCool …)

Seminar: Ethics and professional practice in a world of fluid values

Ethics and professional practice in a world of fluid values
Speaker: Professor John Buckeridge (RMIT, Melbourne)
Date: Tuesday, 7 August, 2007
Time: 10.00-11.00 am (followed by in interactive discussion session 11.00-12.00 pm)
Location: Griffith Duncan Theatre, University of Newcastle

ABSTRACT: This seminar will use case studies in engineering and science wherein varying values have led to conflict. In these situations, both sides perceive that they hold the “high moral ground’. The presentation will explore how these issues may be resolved, using three key moral constructs: virtue ethics, utilitarianism and deontology. Participants will consider whether there is more than one ethical way in which a moral conundrum can be resolved. They will be challenged to make difficult decisions, and to defend their conclusions.

THE PRESENTER: John St James Stewart BUCKERIDGE, PhD, FAustIMM, CP(Env), FIEAust, FGS (Lond.) is Professor of Natural Resources Engineering and Head of the School of Civil, Environmental & Chemical Engineering at RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. John is President of the International Union of Biological Sciences, (and chairs the IUBS Bioethics Committee), he is also President of the International Society of Zoological Sciences, a member of the Victoria Biotechnology Ethics Advisory Committee, a Councillor of the Royal Society of Victoria and has acted as consultant on environmental ethics to UNESCO’s COMEST (World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology). In 2004 he was appointed honorarprofessor at Wismar University, Germany, in recognition of his work in engineering ethics.

Philosopher's Carnival, No. Fifty

The 50th Philosopher’s Carnival is presently being hosted at Philosophy Sucks! Yes, the Philosopher’s Carnival has been cobbled together fifty times …

Mr Brown, generous host, chose the theme ‘Mind, Meaning and Morals’ and it is into those three groupings that you will find the various submissions.

Chalmers on Moral Truths

David Chalmers has a couple of interesting powerpoint slide shows posted in his Conference wrap-up .

Any budding (or full-blown) ethicists would find "Moral Relativism and Conceptual Analysis" interesting. I can also highly recommend "From the Aufbau to the Canberra Plan" after seeing it presented at AAP 2007.

Conference – Moral Cognition and Meta-Ethics

The Centre for Applied Philosophy and Public Ethics will be hosting a conference on the interplay of meta-ethics and cognition, in Sydney, in late August.

Review Notice – ‘The Evolution of Morality’

‘Controversial’ Australian (?) ethicist Peter Singer has reviewed Richard Joyce’s The Evolution of Morality for NDPR – includes the requisite discussion of primates …

Question On Ethics And Schools

Yesterday the Sydney Morning Herald ran an article – ‘Call for ethics classes as alternative to religious teaching’ – on a call by the Federation of Parents and Citizens Associations of NSW for ethics classes to be provided in New South Wales public schools as alternative to the weekly scripture lessons that have been part of the public system for most of its history.

The questions I want to put forward are (i) should ethics classes have a place in the school system, and (ii) how should ethics be taught in schools?

For reference, the St James Ethics Centre’s proposal is available here.

On Ethics And The University

“Unfortunately, there is no employer who carefully scrutinises the ethics courses to make sure they are rigorous enough. University students know that if they fail ethics, or don’t even take ethics, they can still graduate from university and go on to a good job.

And ethics lecturers know that if they make the subject too difficult, nobody will take it. If nobody takes your subject, the university starts asking why they need you. What student wants to waste their time doing a subject that no employer cares about and then fail because it is too difficult and there is too much work involved?

Over time the ethics and philosophy courses become easier and require less work. Not as many books need to be read. The exams are graded less rigorously. Less is required from the assignments” – Eric Claus, ‘Ethically Speaking’ (On Line Opinion).

Question On The Nature Of Ethics

Is it appropriate to consider an ‘ethic’ to be anything more than the schema of norms adopted by an individual in the course of ethical decision making?

[Thanks Bill for the post that got me thinking along this particular line.]

Objective Ethics, morality reason judgement faith law meaning relativism death teaching children and honesty

An important point from the discussion today I'd like to highlight is that 'objective ethics' is a contradiction.

There are some systems of beleif that might argue that there is such a thing as objective ethics. For example, religions would assert a set of moral truths - "thou shalt" - which are universally or objectively (ie: true independantly of subjective construction or judgement) true because God/s said they are. And that the set of moral truths constitute an objectively true system of ethics. Alternatively a scientific or sociological approach might investigate the frequency of actual morals and moral principles across society. It might turn out that all cultures or persons hold one or more moral principles/imperatives in common, and that these may be regarded as objective moral standards. Or there might be statistically frequent ones, with confidence intervals etc which are more or less 'objectively true' prima facie from an empirical science point of view. Again these may be regarded as constituting an objective ethical system.


First lets consider terminology. I'll use philosophical definitions, rather than laymans terms, since we are philosophers (In laymans terms 'ethics' and 'morality' are little distinguished. Regardless of terminology, the distinctions are useful for our understanding of stuff). A moral is a 'should'. A moral statement is an assertion that we should behave some way as opposed to a statement that we do behave some way. Morals always involve a choice.

An ethical relation is one in which two or more 'subjects', capable of making choices, can make moral judgements of one another, ie: you should have done x, you should not have done y; it was wrong to do x; you are right; all people at all times should do x but you did y so you are evil... This might also be extended to other judgements, like you are beautiful, but lets stick with morals right now, since most people think of ethics as being about morality.

So it is 'unethical' to treat another 'subject' (like a person) as an 'object' (like a stone, or a tool, only). It is ethical when dealing with subjects to recognise that they are capable of constructing the world in their own way, their own opinions about reality, capable of making their own moral judgements, and their own moral judgements of your actions - and importantly, that they do so independantly of you. You never really know what another person is thinking, etc. In an ethical relationship you recognise that someone is like yourself, capable of perceiving and acting in the world, and of judgement, yet they are not yourself, and you cannot understand them in the sufficiently complete way you would understand a 'thing' or object (like a rock or shovel - whether animals can be subjects or to what extent, is debatable).

So then you have the morality of ethical relationships - what should we do to each other. I should treat people well. You should not treat people like objects. You should not treat me like that. You should use rocks this way, not like that. Everyone should obey the law. And so on.
But the point is, that ethics involves 'subjects'. And the distinctively ethical point about this relationship between subjects is that they are each capable of their own judgement. Because it is a matter of subjective judgement it is necessarily not objective.

This does not in any way devalue ethics or morality as a 'meaningless relativism'. Rather it compels us to acknowledge and respect each other and ourselves as arbiters, as judges. We cannot simply say "You're wrong acording to this book of objective morality here so I'll chop off your head". We cannot act lightly without considering the consequences of our actions. We can't assume what other people think without asking them. It compels us to negotiate instead of force, or at least to accept that to force is our own decision and judgeable by others.

It also is not 'meaningless relativism' in that we can talk to each other, and decide, for example that everyone should have a right to walk down the street without being murdered, so lets make a law saying murder is wrong. I wouldn't like to be murdered would you? And lets say, anyone who murders will be locked up by these other people who have decided to follow that through. We can establish moral principles. We can and do agree on them and fight about them. They are not meaningless at all. Because they are intersubjective, not objective, does not make them meaningless or any less important, quite the contrary - it gives each of us and our moral decisions more meaning that we could possibly have if morals were not our choice.

Each of us must say, "I am the arbiter of right and wrong."And each of us must recognise that each other person is too.This gives us enourmous freedom and responsibility.To say "I am the arbiter of right and wrong." is not to say "Yippee I can do whatever I want." On the contrary it makes us weigh our thoughts and deeds with gravity.

It can be hard and conscience wracking to figure out what is the right thing to do, or if we should care at all. But luckily we are equipped with reason so we can figure it out. Ultimately we can say we made the right choice at the time, given the information, no regrets - but only if we accept the freedom/responsibility of being a moral and ethical creature. It is typically when people give themselves over to an 'objective morality' that atrocities are committed.

One of the reasons religion is appealing to people is because it is hard to figure out what is right and wrong. (Notably many people who turn to religion are people who have really stuffed up their choices in life and have become desperate.) Life becomes easier if someone else tells you.
But I reckon that's a bit of a weak way to be a person (Blessed are the meek!). It is to relinquish what it is that makes you a person - your ability to judge and to choose. (Worth noting here also, that religious beleif depends on faith, not reason which is what we need for judgement).

I must acknowledge that I get a lot of this thinking from Emmanual Levinas - and also that this breif discussion doesn't nearly do him justice. I reckon no philosopher ought to be comfortable talking about ethics unless they have read Levinas' Totality And Infinity - so read it. On reading it - I have to say I didn't understand a single thing he said for 6 pages. Then when I finally did it was like a revelation and I understood what he was saying for those six pages. So - it's a difficult read at first, and it would be good to have a teacher, I beleive Chris Falzon knows Levinas, but once you get into it it is beautiful and thoroughly rewarding. I was almost religious about this book for a while.

On that note - I have no objection to philosophy being personal. Why do philosophy if it isn't relevant to you? Considering the discussion today, I'd like to add that reading Levinas was a significant factor in my decision not to abort the first 'accident' my wife and I had. It has affected my thinking ever since and been a good basis for deciding about how to relate to my children. They are like me, I will teach them, but they are not me, they are subjects and form their own judgements etc. The way Levinas describes love, fecundity, old age and children certainly provides an a-religious conciliation with death.

So when my daughter beleived in God for about a year or so, it was not vitally important to convince her otherwise. I never beleived that her beleifs could be controlled absolutely by me, nor the scripture teacher. And I was ready to accept it if she decided to remain a Christian. I was always honest with her about my own beleifs, which are very hard to explain to a 5 to 6 year old, but I did what I could to explain if she asked. One day she said "Now I beleive in God about a quarter." and that was all her figuring out - even at 6 years old. I never told her not to beleive in God. I didn't even say I didn't beleive in God. But that said, ours is not a religious household.

When there is no objectivity, no absolute truth, independant of us, what matters above all is honesty.

Ethical Hypothetical – On Disability, Voluntary Euthanasia, And Organ Donation

A hypothetical:

A, a young man of utilitarian persuasion, decides that life with a disability is not justified. A signs a statutory declaration to such effect, adding that in the case of an emergency where an operation could save his life though leave him disabled he refuses medical assistance other than that which will enable his organs to be donated.

A, after this declaration, is involved in an accident that leaves him unconscious and with a leg requiring amputation. Surgery to remove the limb will be uncomplicated, and enable A to live with a disability. Following A's instructions will involve the medical professions in the death of an individual who would otherwise have recovered, though his organs will be donated to numerous other individuals who will benefit from them.

[Cross posted at Epideixis, where comments have been enabled.]

[Comments, you may note, have been enabled here (MH 24/01).]

Kant and the Ethics of Humility

Jeanine Grenberg, Kant and the Ethics of Humility, Cambridge University Press, 2005, 289 pp, $75.00 (hbk), ISBN 0521846811.

Reviewed by Patrick Frierson, Whitman College

Jeanine Grenberg's Kant and the Ethics of Humility sets out to explain and defend a distinctively Kantian conception of humility as "that meta-attitude which constitutes the moral agent's proper perspective on herself as a dependent and corrupt but capable and dignified rational agent" (133). But Grenberg not only explains what humility might mean for Kant. She seeks, first, to defend Kant's notion of humility against contemporary accounts of (and objections to) humility as a virtue: "while the book is . . . guided by [Kant's] picture of humility . . . the overall intent is to defend philosophically the view that humility remains a virtue, and indeed a central virtue" (7). Secondly, Grenberg uses humility to illustrate how one might develop a robust Kantian virtue ethics (chs. 2-3). Grenberg challenges Kantians to give humility more prominence, and she shows how central moral categories that might seem too "thick" can play fundamental roles within a Kantian ethic (cf. 7, 80-103). Read the full review Here.

Baier on Professional Ethicists

Can we approve of a division of labor in which the theorists keep their hands clean of real-world applications, the ones who advise the decision-makers, those who do “applied ethics,” are like a consumer reports service, pointing out the variety of available theories and what costs and benefits each has for a serious user of it? Does the profession of moral philosophy now display that degeneration of a Kantian moral outlook that Hegel portrays, where there are beautiful souls doing their theoretical thing and averting their eyes from what is happening in the real, even from what is happening in the way of “application” of their own theories, and there are those paid to be the ‘conscience’ of the medical, business or legal profession, what Hegel calls the moral valets, the professional moral judges? (Baier, A, Postures of the Mind Essays on Mind and Morals, pp 233 - 234).

Contra - Singer.

This is part of an assignment I did last year for Dr Mintoff's course on Ethics in Social Work. (Just for the record, don't be a dill and copy it, Turnitin will detect the plagarism, and besides it's my work, not yours.)

I'm posting it in light of the recent discussions about Peter Singer's work with regard to the ethics of our treatment of animals.

The “Contra Singer"Argument

I do eat meat, and do not think it is morally wrong to do so. From this, it becomes obvious that I think that Singer is wrong.
If we are the same as animals, and animals have no moral obligation, then we have no moral obligation.
For example, if an animal does something we consider to be immoral, like my cat eating a pigeon even though I feed him ample pet biscuits, we do not judge them by our standards.
But, we can be moral. That is to say, we have the option, to be moral, or not moral, as we choose, (unlike my cat).

This is not sufficient justification however, as will be seen. Consider the two following statements:
1.We should be moral because we can.
2.We should eat meat because we can.
Statement number 2 is clearly one that Singer would not agree with. And with good reason, as statements of the form: We should X because we can (X), are highly problematic from an ethical viewpoint, and by themselves, do not form a valid argument.
Thus it is possible to say:
I. We should follow the principle of Equal Consideration of Interests, because we can.
II. But: If we should X, if we have the option of X or not X, is false.
So: We should not feel compelled to take other species interests into consideration, or indeed fulfil any moral obligations whatsoever, simply in virtue of us having the capability to choose to be moral or not.

Now: the objection may be made that I have not shown anything, except that the capacity or ability to be moral is a necessary but insufficient condition of actually being moral. But consider this: Singer himself says that we should not base our concern for others on what abilities they possess . That is to say, that we should not discriminate against animals, for example, because of how their mental capacities differ from ours. This seems agreeable enough, but discrimination cuts both ways. So I would suggest that to place a moral expectation on humans, because of our ability to be moral, is a form of discrimination directed against humans (or indeed any being judged capable of making these distinctions). Since discrimination on the basis of species, or on the basis of abilities, is specifically prohibited by Singer’s account there are only two options. One is to remove the moral obligation on humans, thus removing the discrimination, (allowing me to eat meat) which does render the account somewhat useless as a guide for behaviour. The other is to admit that Singer’s account is self contradictory, and thus invalid (this option allows me to eat meat also).
This response to Singer has very little to do with the ‘forceful reply’ as it does not deny that animals, or severely intellectually disabled humans for that matter, have interests. What I have attempted to show is that Singer’s argument does not give a coherent account of why we should take them into consideration.

In response to this Joe said something along the lines of this: that it is not discriminatory for someone who can't actually do a job to be passed over for someone who can do it. Similarly it is not discriminatory for us to be expected to take animal's interests into consideration, even if they can't do the same for us. This is a good point, and could shoot down my claims of discrimination somewhat. But I can't help but feel that the analogy is not quite right. A better analogy would be expecting or even forcing someone of sufficient intellect to go to university and study theoretical physics or medicine, rather than letting them choose a vocation that made no use of their mental skills whatsoever. If this is a more accurate way of characterising the argument, then the outcome is less clear cut. We may want to say that it is a person's right to choose how they use what they have, even if there are distinct advantages, for them and for the rest of us if they do, for example, become a doctor and cure some terrible disease. Thus in both cases (meat eater and non-doctor) they could be willfully contributing to more a situation with more suffering (animals and patients), but there is a difference somewhere as Singer would condemm the meat-eater but not the person who could become a doctor but doesn't.

On the other hand, it could be that due to the ethical/moral aspect of this topic, the above might not be the right way to characterise the debate. I can't decide right now. Maybe someone out there can clarify this position for me.